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1.  Road Map 
 
Comparative constructions are a classical topic in semantics. The vast majority of 
the literature on comparatives, though, is focused on languages like English, 
French or German. These languages are special in that adjectives take 
comparative morphology, and in that they allow for comparative phrases as well 
as clauses. Stassen’s (1985) survey of comparative constructions shows that this is 
a rare pattern while commonly, languages develop their comparative grammar 
from older locative constructions. In my paper, I will take one such type of 
comparative pattern as my starting point and attempt to provide a minimal 
semantic analysis for this type of construction. In the last section, I will point out 
potential applications in the analysis of comparatives in English or German. 
 The basic pattern that I will investigate is exemplified, among other 
languages, in Udmurt (Perm language; ≈ 520.000 native speakers; Russia/Europe) 
and Mandarin Chinese. These languages posses no (native) comparative 
morphology, and use only phrasal comparatives. Comparisons are built along a 
pattern that is roughly similar to (1): 
 
(1) (Seen) from Paul, Henk is tall. = ‘Henk is taller than Paul’ 
 
The following examples show positive and comparative statements in Udmurt. 
 
(2) Puny viž'mo 
 dog smart 
 ‘the dog is smart’ 
 
(3) Puny viž'mo(-ges) gondyr-leś 
 dog smart(.COMP) bear.ABLATIV 
 ‘the dog is smarter than the bear’ 
                                                
 
  The research in this paper was initiated by a spirited discussion on Universal Grammar with 
Eberhard Winkler. He not only drew my attention to Udmurt comparatives, but also helped me to 
contact Udmurt informants. Warm thanks are due to Mingya Liu who is willing to discuss 
Mandarin Chinese at all times. Important criticisms were offered by Ariel Cohen, Louise 
McNally, Paula Menendez-Benito, Magdalena Schwager and the audiences of The Semantics Tea 
at Göttingen, the DGfS 2009 workshop on Comparison, and SALT XIX. They are not to blame if 
the resulting account is still less than perfect. 
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The comparative morpheme –ges is optional and a recent loan from Russian 
grammar. In the following, I will give examples without –ges whenever possible.1 
We find that Udmurt adjectives can be used in two ways: The subject can be 
compared to an implicit standard of comparison (like in English or German), but 
the standard of comparison can also be explicated, like in (3). I will call such 
explicated points of comparison the landmark, and will use “landmark argument” 
as a cover term for all constituents that serve to introduce a landmark. Hence, seen 
from Paul as well as gondyr-leś are landmark arguments, introducing the 
landmarks Paul and the-bear, respectively.2  The next three sentences use an 
adjective that allows measure phrases. (6) shows that the measure phrase 
expresses the difference between subject referent and the landmark.  
 
(4)  ad'ami pič'i/lapeg 
 man  small 
 ‘the man is small’ 
 
(5) ad'ami pič'i korka-leś (or: lapeg ‘small’) 
 man small house.ABL 
 ‘the man is smaller than the house’ 
 
(6) ad'ami metr-ly   korka-leś lapeg 
 man meter.DAT house.ABL small 
 ‘the man is 1m smaller than the house’ 
 
If no landmark is expressed, the measure phrase gives the absolute measure of the 
subject, with a presupposition that ‘1m’ is a small size. In a first approximation, 
we could suggest the following argument structure for the adjective: 
 
 [[ viž'mo ]] 
 λΔ.λc.λx[ µSMART(x) = µSMART(c) + Δ ] 
 
I will use Kennedy’s measure functions µADJ that map individuals to a degree on the 
scale that the adjective refers to. 
 The above tentative analysis looks as if adjectives in Udmurt share the 
argument structure of three-place verbs. However, there is one important respect 
which shows that the picture is not so simple. Udmurt does not allow negative 
quantifiers in the landmark argument. This is shown by the following non-data: 
 
                                                
1The only construction where –ges seems mandatory are elliptical comparisons: ‘Pete is tall. 
Olin is taller’. (Eberhard Winkler, p.c., see also Winkler, 2005) 
2In the second part, I will turn to the question whether than-clauses, than-phrases, als-phrases 
etc are also landmark arguments. I think they are, but nothing at present hinges on this assumption. 
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(7) ‚the house is taller than no tree’ (‚Das Haus ist größer als kein Baum’) 
 —*— 
 
Native Udmurt informants with German as second fluent language refused to 
translate, and word-by-word versions I offered were consistently classed as 
unacceptable. We will later see similar examples in Mandarin Chinese which are 
classed as ungrammatical. The status of the English/German sentence in (7) is 
open to debate, and I’d ask the reader not to check her intuitions about the 
grammaticality and meaning of such examples at the present point. For the 
languages at issue, we can diagnose a ban on negative quantifiers (BoNQ) in the 
landmark argument. This ban holds for comparative as well as equative 
constructions, as will be shown in the next sections. In survey, the present paper 
aims to propose an analysis for comparatives with the following characteristics: 
 
• simple comparatives without comparative morphology 
• Ban on Negative Quantifiers in the landmark argument 
 
The main analysis will be developed with reference to Mandarin Chinese (mainly 
because data were easier to get). In Section 2, I revisit the data and Section 3 will 
be devoted to an analysis of BoNQ. Section 4 explores several examples to show 
how all parts fit together. Section 5 will compare the proposal to other recent 
work on comparatives, specifically phrasal-only comparatives and comparatives 
without morphemes. I discuss Hofstetter (2009) on Turkish, Bhatt + Takahashi 
(2007) on Hindi/Urdu, and Xiang (2003), (2005) on Mandarin Chinese. None of 
these proposals lends itself to an analysis of BoNQ effects. Section 5 will also 
evaluate Gajewski’s (2009) account for BoNQ effects in English (which he 
phrases in the framework of Heim 2000, 2006). His analysis, in essence, shares 
the assumptions about scoping of the present account, and therefore Gajewski’s 
explanation for the Ban on Negative Quantifiers is, in part, similar to the one that 
will be given here. However, the present analysis can easily be extended to 
account for licensed NPIs in the landmark argument. Likewise, the present 
analysis extends to BoNQ in equatives that is attested in Mandarin Chinese and 
elsewhere. This is due to the fact that my analysis will refrain from using sets of 
degrees (pace Schwarzschild and Wilkinson, 2002 and others), doing justice to 
the fact that the languages in question express comparatives as relations between 
individuals, never between (sets of) degrees. Gajewski’s (2009) analysis, in 
contrast, wrongly excludes NPIs in the comparative phrase and makes no 
predictions about equatives at all. 
 The discussion of Gajewski (2009) will lead to the question whether parts 
of the present analysis should be transferred to languages like German and 
English. In the final part of the paper, I will take a broader look at BoNQ effects 
in other languages, and in other guises. It turns out that BoNQ effects are a quite 
widespread phenomenon and should be taken serious by theories of comparatives. 
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2. Comparison in Mandarin Chinese  
 
The following examples survey some facts about comparatives in Mandarin 
Chinese. The adjective is always used in the positive form. The landmark 
argument is marked with the particle bi. Measure phrases in sentences without a 
landmark argument count as “distance to zero”.  
 
(8) Nana gao (liang-li-mi). 
    Nana tall (2cm). 
    'Nana is (2cm) tall.' 
 
The use of all adjectives ADJ with measure phrases presupposes that the subject is 
more ADJ than average. Hence, (8) with the measure phrase can only be used if  
Nana is a cockroach or other animal for which 2 cm counts as ‘tall’. Unlike 
English or German, Mandarin Chinese does not possess pairs of unmarked/ 
marked antonyms, all adjectives are marked in the sense of Bierwisch (1987). No 
such presuppositions arise if the sentence contains an explicit landmark. 
 
(9) Nana bi Beibei gao. 
    Nana from Beibei tall. 
    'Nana is taller than/from Beibei.' 
 
(10) Nana bi Beibei gao liang-li-mi. 
    Nana from Beibei tall 2cm. 
    'Nana is 2cm taller than/from Beibei.' 
 
(11) Nana bi Beibei cong-ming (hen-duo). 
    Nana from Beibei smart      (very much) 
    'Nana is (much) smarter than/from Beibei.' 
 
Notably, (10) and (11) do not presuppose that Nana or Beibei are tall, or smart, 
respectively. These examples suggest that a simple semantics of the adjective 
might be a good starting point. 
 
(B) [[ gao ]] 
 λΔ.λc.λx[ µTALL(x) = µTALL(c) + Δ ] 
 
This contrasts with earlier analyses for comparatives in Mandarin Chinese (Xiang, 
2003, 2005) which remain closer to a degree set analysis for English (Heim 2000, 
2006); see Section 5 for a comprehensive discussion. Let us turn to the Ban on 
Negative Quantifiers BoNQ  in the landmark argument. As (12) shows, it is 
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possible to express a negative comparison in Mandarin Chinese with negation at 
the sentence level.  
 
(12) Lang Lang  bu bi  qi-ta ren-he ren gao. 
 Lang Lang not from  other  any man  tall. 
 ‘Lang Lang is not taller than any other man.’ 
 
However, neither a negative nor a downward-entailing quantifier is allowed in the 
landmark argument. 
 
(13) *Lang Lang bi qi-ta mei-you ren gao. 
 Lang Lang from other no man/men tall. 
 unavailable: ‘Lang Lang is taller than no other man.’ 
 
(14) *Lang Lang bi hen-shao ren gao. 
 Lang Lang from few man/men tall.  
 unavailable: ‘Lang Lang is taller than few other men.’ 
 
Similar restrictions apply in equative constructions. 
 
(15) Hong he Peter  yi-yan cong-ming 
 Hong  with Peter the-same clever 
 ‘Hong is as clever as Peter’ 
 
(16) *Hong he mei-you nang-hai yi-yang cong-ming 
 Hong with no boys the-same clever 
 unavailable: ‘Hong is (exactly) as clever as no boy’ 
 
Mandarin Chinese readily allows other quantifiers in the landmark argument, as 
well as in equative constructions. This is exemplified in (17) and (18). 
 
(17) Nana bi qi-ta suo-you/dua-shu/yi-xie xiao-hai dou gao. 
Nana from other all / most / some children DISTR tall. 
    'Nana is taller than/from all / most / some other children.' 
 
(18) Hong he qi-ta sho-you xue-sheng yi-yan cong-ming/gao 
 Hong  with other all student the-same clever/tall 
 ‘Hong is as clever/tall as every other student’ 
 
Dually, Mandarin Chinese allows for negative quantifiers in subject position of 
comparative sentences. (mei and mei-you are variants of the negative quantifier 
which are preferred for simple and compound head nouns.) 
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(19) mei ren bi Lang Lang gao. 
 no  man from Lang Lang tall. 
 ‘no man is tall, seen from Lang Lang’ 
 
(20) mei-you xiao-hai bi Lang Lang gao. 
 no  child from Lang Lang tall. 
 ‘no child is tall, seen from Lang Lang’ 
  
While negative quantifiers are generally unavailable in object position, Mandarin 
Chinese allows for other DE quantifiers in object DPs, like DE few. Yet, these 
quantifiers are again ungrammatical in the landmark argument of comparisons. 
 
(21) a.  Lisi (zi) fan-le hen-shuo cuo-wu 
  Lisi (only) make-LE few mistakes 
  ‘Lisi made only few mistakes’ 
 b. *Lisi bi hen-shuo xiao-hai gao 
  Lisi from few  children tall 
  unavailable: ‘Lisi is taller than few children’ 
  
We can hence conclude that BoNQ does not follow from more general restrictions 
like a ban on quantifiers in the landmark argument, or any general unavailability 
of downward entailing quantifiers in object position.  
 
 
3.  Deriving BoNQ 
 
3.1. Landmark Sets, the Intuition 
 
The main idea that I want to explore is that comparative constructions express a 
comparison between the subject referent and the elements of a landmark set C. 
The landmark argument contributes this landmark set C. Quantifiers in the 
landmark argument do not quantify over comparative propositions. Instead, they 
take low scope and contribute to the choice of a landmark set C. In the following, 
I give a list of DPs and their desirable landmark sets. 
 
 
 [[ Peter ]] → C = { Peter } 
 [[ the pope ]] →  C = { ιx.POPE(x) } 
 [[ every boy ]] → C = { x | BOY(x) } 
 [[ most boys ]] → C ⊂ BOYS ∧ MOST(BOYS, C) ∧ …?… 
 [[ some boys ]] → C ⊂ BOYS ∧ |C|>1 ∧ …?… 
 [[ no boy ]] → C = ∅ 
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A comparative sentence simply asserts that the subject referent exceeds all 
elements in the landmark set.  
 For proportional quantifiers like most, some we will consider a subset of 
the noun extension that is of the appropriate size (i.e. contains most, more than 
one of the objects in the noun extension). The …?… part indicates that we might 
want to add more restrictions on C in such cases. These will be discussed below. 
 The quantifier no should yield the empty set. Comparison to “everyone in 
the empty set” is senseless. As it yields trivial truth conditions, the respective 
sentences count as ungrammatical. Here, I follow similar arguments by e.g. 
Dowty 1979 on durational phrases; Barwise/Cooper 1981; von Fintel 1993, 
Gajewski 2002, 2009; Hackl/Fox 2006, among others. The assumption that a 
comparison to nothing-at-all is inherently senseless seems a convincing instance 
of the hypothesis that grammar can ban constructions with inherently trivial truth 
conditions. 
 If there is no comparison phrase, the landmark argument will be 
instantiated indexically. Mandarin Chinese allows for two options. If no measure 
phrase is expressed, then C = { JoeDoeAdj } where JoeDoeAdj is a hypothetical 
average individual with respect to the dimension measured by the adjective.3 If a 
measure phrase but no landmark phrase is expressed, the landmark C contains an 
abstract object of size zero. I will not attempt to predict why C = { JoeDoeAdj } 
and measure phrases do not co-occur. One could speculate that this 
incompatibility is a consequence of different granularities. The size of a folk 
average JoeDoe seems located on a scale that is less fine-grained than the scales 
of measure phrases. Note that adverbial modifiers like very, extremely, moderately 
(or their equivalents in Mandarin Chinese) can express that the subject is very, 
extremely, or moderately far away from average. This coheres with the 
assumption that average is located on a coarse-grained scale with few distinct 
points whereas the denotations of measure phrases are located on more precise 
scales. However, such an idea needs to be fully spelled-out.  
 
 
3.2. Deriving Landmark Sets: The Details 
 
I will now define a function which maps a quantifier Q to a landmark set F(Q). 
This function will be parameterized (it needs to “know” the dimension of the 
adjective) and will make a choice in cases where different sets could equally well 
serve as landmark sets. Let DP = Det N denote a generalized quantifier Q. 
 According to Johnsen (1987), we know that for quantifiers Q = [[ Det N ]] 
which are denotations of natural language determiner phrases, the extension of N 
can be recovered as the minimal “set where Q lives on”. Let NOUN(Q) be the 
partial function on generalized quantifiers which maps Q on the set it lives on: 
                                                
3Average individuals allow us to keep all other parts of the analysis constant. Note that JoeDoe 
will, in many cases, not be an actual living being. Compare the zero individual.  
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   NOUN(Q) = [[ N ]] where Q = [[ Det N ]] 
 
From these, we define the candidates for landmarks, CAND(Q). Note that 
candidates for landmarks are a subset of what has been called witness set in 
Barwise and Cooper (1981).  
 
 CAND(Q) := { X | X ⊆ NOUN(Q) ∧ Q(X) ∧ ¬∃Y( Y⊂ X ∧ Q(Y) ) } 
 
These candidates comprise all small subsets in NOUN(Q) of which the quantifier 
is true. For instance, for most mice, CAND( most mice) comprises all subsets of 
the mice in question which are large enough to count as “most” and for which one 
mouse less would make them too small to be “most mice”.   
 The landmark set C is chosen from the set of candidates CAND(Q). I will 
use the notation ƒ(Q) for the final choice of landmark set.4 If CAND(Q) is a 
singleton, this choice is fully determined. If there is a true choice, different 
pragmatic strategies can operate. 
 
Scalar inference driven choice: If we consider the logical strength of alternative 
comparative statements, it can make sense to assume that ƒ(Q) is a set which 
contains only small elements. Else, the speaker could have decided to use a more 
comprehensive quantifier in her statement. For instance, if someone states that Bei 
Bei is taller than 50% of the other children, there is a pragmatic inference to the 
end that Bei Bei  is not taller than any larger proportion of the children. Else, the 
speaker could have made a stronger statement. In a scalar inference driven choice, 
ƒ(Q) will adhere to the following additional requirement: 
 
  ¬∃Y( Y ∈ CAND( Q ) ∧ max{ µA(y) | y∈Y } < max{ µA(c) | c∈ ƒ(Q) } ) 
 
This choice will attribute the logically weakest meaning to a positive comparison: 
 
(22) Bei Bei bi qi-ta  duo-shu  xiao-hai  (dou)  gao. 
Bei Bei  from  other  most  children  (DIST)  tall 
’Bei Bei is taller than most other children’ 
 
Under this interpretation, it follows that the children not contained in the 
landmark set are indeed taller than Bei Bei. Allowing for a certain vagueness, we 
could rephrase this as “If you line up all kids according to size, Bei Bei would be 
placed at the higher end but is not among the absolutely tallest ones”. According 
to my informants, (22) can indeed be used in this sense.  
 
                                                
4Hence, ƒ(Q) and C will both stand for the landmark set, where ƒ(Q) is used when meaning 
composition is in focus. I hope that no confusion arises from this notational homonymy. 
149
Specific use:ƒ(Q) is a set in CAND(Q) that the speaker has in mind. The speaker 
might not know whether C contains smallest elements or just any elements. This 
use corresponds to the a. reading for (23). The reading in b. shows the scalar 
inference reading. This reading is dispreferred, according to the informant, at least 
for the quantifier some in the present example.  
 
(23) Bei Bei bi qi-ta yi-xie xiao-hai (dou) gao 
Bei Bei from other some children (DIST) tall 
a. ‚Bei Bei is taller than some children (I know)’ 
b. ‚Bei Bei is taller than some (of the smallest) children’ (dispreferred) 
 
Epistemically open use: Sometimes, a speaker might use a proportional quantifier 
without any further knowledge about the respective landmark set. For instance, 
someone could gather information about a race in which Bei Bei is taking part. 
This person could interview an arbitrary selection of runners about Bei Bei and 
find that some of them passed Bei Bei in the race. She can report that Bei Bei was 
slower than several other runners, referring to a set of unknown runners as 
landmark set. It remains open whether Bei Bei in fact was slower than many or 
even most other people. While it could be argued that the witness set is specific in 
some sense (“the runners that I interviewed”), the restrictions on ƒ(Q) will be 
practically nil for persons who hear this report. They will barely learn that there is 
some set of runners such that Bei Bei was slower than the slowest one of these. 
 
Worst possible choice use. The present analysis predicts that an increased domain 
NOM(Q) can allow for new choices of landmark sets that lead to logically 
stronger propositions. If we have to chose a witness set of runners in a sentence 
like Bei Bei was slower than some other runner, we could select for the fastest 
(scalar inference use), a set of known runners (specific) or just any old set of 
runners (epistemically open). However, a sentence like Bei Bei was slower than 
any other runner indicates that Bei Bei’s slowness exceeds the slowness of 
everyone in just all kinds of landmark sets that we might select, exploring the full 
domain NOM(Q) in the widest possible sense. Following Chierchia (2004, 2006), 
such domain widening only makes sense if the resulting proposition is logically 
stronger than the proposition that can be computed with reference to a smaller 
domain. This is so if we assume that a larger domain is exploited  in order to 
select a landmark set with very slow runners. Under that choice, the sentence Bei 
Bei was slower than any other runner conveys a superlative (‘slower than the 
slowest’) not an existential statement. Hence, we could make sense of the use of 
NPIs in landmark arguments in the present analysis. They invite a worst possible 
choice of a landmark set for an existential quantifier, and hence lead to a 
quasi-universal superlative reading.  
 I deliberately refrained from discussing this case with reference to any 
specific language. The status of polarity sensitive items in landmark arguments is 
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tricky to assess. German irgendein, jemals are clearly NPIs, as they never have a 
free choice use. They can be used in landmark arguments. 
 
(24) Helge ist schwerer als irgendein (anderer) Jockey jemals war. 
Helge is heavier than any (other) jockey ever was 
 ‘Helge is heavier than any other jockey ever has been’ 
 
Gajewski (2009) tentatively assumes that English any in comparison phrases 
might be free choice any. Yet, ever does not show free choice readings and is 
likewise allowed in comparison phrases in English. In view of this fact, an NPI 
analysis of any in comparison phrases would be preferable. This thread is not 
followed in Gajewski (2009).  
 
(25) Sandy is taller than any other child. 
(26) Sandy was happier than any guest who ever entered our bar.  
 
In Mandarin Chinese, NPI renhe (‘any’) can occur in the landmark (bi) argument 
but requires the particle dou. 
 
(27) Bei Bei bi renhe (qi-ta) xiao-hai *(dou) gao 
Bei Bei BI any (other) child DOU tall 
 ‘Bei Bei is taller than any other child’ 
 
The function of dou, sometimes glossed as ‘distributive operator’, with renhe 
remains to be explored. Xiang (2008) sketches a very interesting analysis for dou 
which fits the present picture nicely. She reviews several uses of dou where it 
serves (a) to exhaust all choices to be made in a set of sets or (b) to chose 
maximal elements in a set of ordered alternatives. The paper argues convincingly 
against a purely distributive or universal-quantifying analysis for dou. In 
examples like (27), we could hence assume that dou either serves to ensure that 
the sentence is true for all possible choices of landmark sets in the set of 
candidates (including the worst case choice). Alternatively, dou could ensure that 
the candidate landmark set with the tallest children is chosen. The formal 
spell-out of the paper unfortunately is too vague to determine the optimal version.  
 Overall, this survey shows typological evidence in favor of NPI licensing 
in landmark arguments of comparatives. An analysis of comparatives that can in 
principle integrate NPI licensing is hence desirable.  
Let me finally comment on the flexibility of the present approach, which contrasts 
with the pre-set semantic composition of other analyses. Other analyses of 
comparatives commonly are tantamount to the reading that is produced by the 
scalar inference driven choice of landmark set. This preference could be 
hard-wired into the analysis and the remaining choices between different 
landmark sets would all yield logically equivalent outcomes. However, I think 
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that the flexibility inherent in the present proposal offers interesting possibilities 
that are warranted by data. 
 
 
4.  Semantic Composition 
 
4.1 Positives and Comparatives 
 
In the present section, I show the semantic composition of several types of 
examples. As before, I make use of Kennedy’s measure functions µADJ. For 
instance, µTALL is the degree function which maps an object to its degree of 
tallness on a scale determined by the adjective’s lexical meaning (Kennedy, 
1999). 
 
(28) Nana bi BeiBei gao (liang-li-mi). 
    Nana BI Bei Bei tall (2cm). 
    'Nana is (2cm) taller than/from Beibei.' 
 
 [[ gao ]] 
 λΔ.λc.λx[ µTALL(x) = µTALL(c) + Δ ] 
 
This adjective denotation can combine with a measure phrase like [[ liang-li-mi ]] 
= 2cm. 
 
 [[ gao liang-li-mi ]] 
 λΔ.λc.λx[ µTALL(x) = µTALL(c) + Δ ] (2cm) 
 = λc.λx[ µTALL(x) = µTALL(c) + 2cm ] 
 
If no measure phrase is expressed, I assume that existential closure over Δ can 
take place. This is a standard way to saturate arguments in other cases which can 
be extended to the adjective. 
 
(29) λc.λx ∃ε [ µTALL(x) = µTALL(c) + ε ] 
 
Depending on the instantiation of the landmark argument c, the contribution of 
(29) can be that the subject’s tallness exceeds the norm, or the tallness of some 
explicit landmark. I will first discuss the positive use of gao in Mandarin Chinese 
In this case, c is instantiated by the “norm entity” for the adjective in question 
(JoeDoeTALL). Interestingly, bare positives are marked for most adjectives in 
MChinese and degree adverbs like hen (‘very’) must be used. They express that 
there is a considerable difference to the norm entity.  
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(30) Nana ?(hen) gao. 
    Nana very tall. 
    'Nana is tall.'  
 
Existential closure over Δ is specified below; it can be achieved by a general 
closure procedure at LF (= e.g. positives in Udmurt, rare cases in MChinese) or as 
the literal contribution of hen. 
 
(31) λc.λx ∃ε [ µTALL(x) = µTALL(c) + ε ] (presupposed: ε is considerable) 
 [[ hen ]] =  λP.λc.λx ∃ε [ P(ε)(c)(x) ∧ ‘ε considerable’ ]  
 where P ranges over relations between degrees and two individuals 
 
The landmark phrase’s head denotes a generalized quantifier Q. I use ƒ for the 
computation of a landmark set C := ƒ(Q). Case/thematic role information in bi 
contributes (32) where Q is a variable of type <<e,t>,t>, P is a binary relation 
instantiated by the adjective.  
 
(32) [[ bi ]] = λQλPλx. ∀c( c ∈ ƒ(Q) → P(c)(x) ) 
 
I will replace ƒ(Q) by C in order to indicate that a quantifier has been combined 
with ƒ and led to the choice of a set C. 
 
(33) [[ bi DP ]] = λPλx. ∀c( c ∈ C → P(c)(x) ) 
 
 If we combine this with the relation in (31), we get 
 
(34) [[ bi DP gao ]] = λx. ∀c( c ∈ C → ∃ε [ µTALL(x) = µTALL(c) + ε ] ) 
 
This states that the subject referent x is such that its degree of tallness exeeds the 
one of each member of the landmark set C by some positive value ε. Depending 
on the landmark set C, different properties arise. I list several options, and the 
resulting variant of (34):  
 
(34) a. DP proper name or definite, C = { a } 
  λx. ∃ε [ µTALL(x) = µTALL(a) + ε ] 
  ‘property of being taller than a’ 
 
 b. No landmark phrase, C = { joe-doe } 
  λx. ∃ε [ µTALL(x) = µTALL(joe-doe) + ε ] 
  ‘taller than average’ (positive use of ‘gao’, adjectives in general) 
 
 c. Downward-entailing quantifiers, C = ∅ 
  λx. ∀c( c ∈ ∅ → ∃ε [ µTALL(x) = µTALL(c) + ε ] ) 
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  a property trivially true for all x, and therefore marked. 
 
 d. Quantifier five over a larger domain, C = {a1, … a5}  
  λx. ∀c( c ∈ { a1, … a5 } → ∃ε [ µTALL(x) = µTALL(c) + ε ] ) 
 
In (34.d) the resulting meaning depends on a choice. If {a1, … a5} are specific 
objects, we get the property of being taller than some known five objects. If {a1, … 
a5} are the result of a scalar inference driven choice, we compute the property of 
being taller than the smallest five objects. Under the worst case choice of {a1, … 
a5}, we’d get the property of being taller than the tallest five objects. These 
properties, finally, can combine with the subject denotation. 
 
 
4.2 Equatives in Mandarin Chinese 
 
If an adjective is used in an equative construction, it is specified by the adverbial 
yi-yan = ‘the same’. This instantiates the measure argument Δ with value 0.  
 
(35) Hong he Nana  yi-yan cong-ming 
 Hong  with Nana the-same clever 
 ‘Hong is as clever as Nana’ 
 [[ cong-ming ]] = λΔ.λc.λx[ µCLEVER(x) = µCLEVER(c) + Δ ] 
 [[ yi-yan cong-ming ]]  
 = λΔ.λc.λx[ µCLEVER(x) = µCLEVER(c) + Δ ] (0) 
 = λc.λx[ µCLEVER(x) = µCLEVER(c) ] 
 
The contribution of the landmark argument remains the same as in comparatives.  
 
(i) [[ he Nana ]] = λPλx. ∀c( c ∈ {Nana} → P(c)(x) ) 
(ii) [[ he Nana yi-yan cong-ming]] 
 = λPλx. ∀c( c ∈ { Nana } → P(c)(x) ) (λc.λx[ µCLEVER(x) = µCLEVER(c) ]) 
 = λx. ∀c( c ∈ { Nana } → λc.λx[ µCLEVER(x) = µCLEVER(c) ](c)(x) ) 
 = λx. ∀c( c ∈ { Nana } → [ µCLEVER(x) = µCLEVER(c) ] ) 
 ‘being as clever as Nana’ 
 
For empty landmark set C, the property again becomes trivial. If the landmark set 
is non-singleton C, the property is ‘the subject referent is equal in dimension 
µCLEVER to all elements in C’. The analysis hence entails that all elements in C are 
Adj-wise equal to each other. This prediction is empirically justified. 
 In summary, I have proposed a simple theory of direct comparison which 
is so far tailored for morphology-free comparison in languages like Mandarin 
Chinese or Udmurt. The landmark argument of the adjective introduces a 
landmark set, and the overall sentence expresses a comparison of the subject 
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referent to all elements in the landmark set. Quantifiers in the landmark argument 
have a special status in that they are interpreted in situ, determining the set of 
candidates that could become the landmark set. They do not undergo quantifier 
raising. This leads to the prediction that negative (downward-entailing) quantifiers 
are not allowed in the landmark argument. This conforms with the observation 
that there is a Ban on Negative Quantifiers in the landmark argument. In the next 
section, my own proposal to account for BoNQ effects will be compared to 
Gajewski (2009), the one and single recent paper where BoNQ effects for English 
are acknowledged and treated. 
 
 
5.  Recent Theories 
 
5.1. Direct Comparison 
 
Hofstetter (2009) discusses comparatives in Turkish where, like in our case, the 
adjective can be used in positive as well as comparative statements along the 
pattern in (1). Hofstetter (p. 193, (13)) proposes the following comparative 
operator which relates two individuals and an adjective. 
 
 [[ Comp.Opturk]]  = λxeλA<d,<e,t>>λye. MAX( λd.A(x)(d) )>MAX( λd.A(y)(d) ) 
 
He assumes that quantifiers combine with adjectives exactly as they combine with 
verbs, including the Heim-Kratzer (1998) treatment to combine quantifiers with 
polyadic relations via QR. Hofstetter reports that Turkish allows negative 
quantifiers in the comparison phrase with a fully compositional meaning. QR-ing 
a negative quantifier from the landmark argument yields an inverse superlative 
reading, ‘for no x is SUBJECT more ADJ than x’. He illustrates his observation 
with the following example (the structure of the negative quantifier remains 
somewhat unclear in the paper).  
 
(36) Maria hiç kimse.den uzun deǧil 
 Maria somebody.Abl tall not 
 ‘Maria is not taller than anybody’, intended as: ‘Maria is shortest’ 
 
Hofstetter’s account would predict, wrongly, that negative quantifiers are 
acceptable in comparative phrases in Chinese, and contribute compositionally. 
 
(37) *Lang Lang bi qi-ta mei-you ren gao. 
 Lang Lang from other no man/men tall. 
 wrongly predicted: ‘Lang Lang is the smallest man’ 
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Note in passing that Hofstetter qualifies the English counterpart as 
ungrammatical; (38) corresponds to his starred example (21) (p. 197). 
 
(38) Maria is taller than nobody. 
 variant judgments: ungrammatical / ‘Mary is smallest’ 
 
Bhatt + Takahashi (2007) offer a direct comparative analysis for Hindi/Urdu, 
arguing extremely carefully that phrasal comparatives should not be viewed as an 
elliptic form of clausal comparatives. The core semantic ingredient of their 
analysis is the following three-place version of the comparative operator. 
 
(39) [[ -er ]] = λxλP<d,t>λy.∃d( P(y,d) ∧ ¬P(x,d) ) 
 
Adjectives denote relations between an individual and all those degrees d which 
are exceeded by the individual, e.g. [[ tall ]]  = λdλx( TALL(x,d) ). Quantifiers in the 
comparative phrase, like in Hofstetter’s analysis, must undergo QR and take 
scope over the comparison relation. As a result, the analysis predicts inverse 
superlative readings for negative quantifiers in the comparison phrase. The paper 
does not discuss data of this kind for Hindi/Urdu.  
  Xiang (2005) adopts a similar analysis for comparatives in Mandarin 
Chinese. No mention is made of negative quantifiers in the landmark argument, 
i.e. they should be allowed and should give rise to inverse superlative readings. 
Possibly, the author relies on a general (syntactic?) ban of no from object phrases. 
However, as we have seen, no such ban holds for other downward-entailing 
quantifiers like few. Therefore, we need to predict the special status of 
downward-entailing quantifiers in landmark arguments.  
 Gajewski (2009) is one of the few who acknowledges that DE quantifiers 
have a “marked” feeling for many speakers of English. He classes sentences like 
(40) as ungrammatical and sets out to modify Heim’s (2000, 2006) analysis of 
comparatives so as to account for this effect. At the present point, I will simply 
take his judgment for granted and discuss his analysis. The incredulous reader is 
referred to Section 6. 
 
(40) *Pedro is more stubborn than no (other) donkey.  
 
Gajewski’s analysis rests on two crucial ingredients. First, he adopts an earlier 
proposal by Bresnan (1973) according to which the DP in the comparison clause 
combines with λx.¬( x is P to degree d). Hence, we talk about sets of degrees not 
reached by the object referents instead of sets of degrees that are reached by the 
object referent(s). The following show combination with all N and no N. 
 
 EVERY x ( N(x) ; ¬( x is P to degree d)) 
 NO x ( N(x) ; ¬( x is P to degree d)) 
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Next, Gajewski’s composition consists in lambda-abstraction over the degree 
argument. The following sets of degrees result; I rewrite them as intervals to show 
what they look like in our two examples. 
 
 { d | EVERY x ( N(x) ; ¬( x is P to degree d)) } = ] MAX(N); ∝ ] 
 { d | NO x ( N(x) ; ¬( x is P to degree d)) } = [ 0 ; MAX(N) ] 
 
MAX(N) stands for the maximal degree reached by some element in N. The 
interval defined by the EVERY set starts just above this maximum, the interval 
defined by the NO set ends exactly with this degree. The actual comparison, 
according to Gajewski, is termed as the requirement that the set of degrees 
reached by the subject referent a has non-empty intersection. 
 
{ d | a is P to degree d } ∩ { d | EVERY x ( N(x) ; ¬( x is P to degree d)) } ≠ ∅ 
{ d | a is P to degree d } ∩ { d | NO x ( N(x) ; ¬( x is P to degree d)) }  ≠ ∅ 
 
The interval notation clarifies what these requirements amount to. The first 
requirement is met if the subject referent a is actually more P than the first 
degrees d that are not reached by any of the elements in N, or in prose, ‘a is P-er 
than every N’. The second requirement is trivially met. It states that two intervals, 
both starting with zero, have non-empty intersection. Gajewski proposes that this 
trivial semantic denotation causes the sentence to be ill-formed.  
 Interestingly, this analysis, like my own, rests on the assumption that 
quantifiers in the comparison phrase receive low scope. Not only does lambda 
abstraction over degrees d take place above the DP quantifier. The crucial point is 
to combine the DP quantifier with the property of not having a certain degree. The 
analysis from the very beginning, so to speak, is only “interested” in degrees that 
exceed the referents of the comparison phrase. Heim (2000, 2006), in contrast, 
would suggest to first compute the set of degrees that most, all, many, some N 
reach, and only afterwards ensure that the subject referent exceeds these.5 
Gajewski’s way to reinforce very low DP scope can be seen as a mirror image of 
my own assumption that DPs are interpreted inside the landmark argument. Low 
scope for DPs in the landmark argument hence seems a core factor in the analysis 
of BoNQ intuitions. How far do the analyses differ in other respects? 
                                                
5I refer to the simpler theory versions endorsed in Heim 2000/2006. Of course, she then 
endorses assumptions about DP scope and operator scope to ensure the correct readings. Given 
that the many variants that are eventually covered, I refrain from a comprehensive discussion here, 
all the more as Gajewski 2009 excellently locates the essential failure of all these versions to 
capture BoNQ intuitions for English. A preliminary summary of his criticisms could be “whatever 
assumptions we make for the quantifiers every and most, we systematically have to assume the 
exact opposite for the scope of no and few in order to derive BoNQ intuitions”. I will not dwell on 
the implausibility of assuming that no takes just that scope which leads to a trivial reading, instead 
of taking a different scope like all other quantifiers and yielding a sensible reading. 
157
 My own analysis proposes to choose landmark sets of objects to which the 
subject referent a is compared. Gajewski’s proposal endorses no such choice. This 
leads to different predictions when we look at existential quantifiers in the 
comparison phrase.  
 
(41) a.  Sandy is taller than some (other) child. 
b.  Sandy is taller than any (other) child. 
 
Version a. and b. of (41) both are grammatical. Let me for the moment assume 
that any in (b.) is the polarity sensitive existential (see discussion above). The set 
of degrees that Gajewski’s account computes from the comparison phrase is 
hence be the same for (a.) and (b.), and is the following: 
 
 { d | SOME x ( N(x) ; ¬( x is P to degree d)) } = ] MIN(N); ∝ ] 
 
The interval of degrees starts just at the first degrees that are above the P-ness of 
some object in N, and goes up to infinity. This does not provide a very good 
starting position for an explanation why any, ever and other NPIs are licensed in 
comparison phrases. In a pragmatic approach based on domain widening 
(Chierchia 2004, 2006), we’d predict that widening the N domain can only make a 
difference if even smaller objects can be considered after domain widening. In the 
following, I compare original and widened N’. The resulting intervals differ only 
if MIN(N’) < MIN(N). 
 
 { d | SOME x ( N(x) ; ¬( x is P to degree d)) } = ] MIN(N); ∝ ] 
 { d | SOME x ( N’(x) ; ¬( x is P to degree d)) } = ] MIN(N’); ∝ ] 
 
If MIN(N’) < MIN(N), then the proposition that Sandy’s size exceeds MIN(N) is 
logically stronger than the proposition that Sandy’s size exceeds MIN(N’). 
Therefore, domain widening can only lead to logically weaker propositions. 
Therefore, the present comparative semantics, in combination with Chierchia 
(2004, 2006) and similar approaches, will wrongly predict that any, ever should 
not be licensed. In logical approaches to NPI licensing, we’d test whether some N 
in (41) can be replaced by some N” where N”⊂ N, preserving truth. Once again, 
the answer is to negative, at least for Gajewski’s analysis. If we replace N by a 
more restricted domain N”, MIN(N”) could be higher than MIN(N). The subject 
referent (Sandy) might exceed MIN(N) in size but not MIN(N”). Hence, under 
Gajewski’s analysis we’d predict that the comparison phrase is not a 
downward-entailing context and NPIs should not be licensed. Gajewski proposes 
a free choice analysis of any but, as I argued above, this is not tenable if we 
consider more NPIs and more languages.  
 The landmark set analysis, in contrast, rests on the choice of a witness set 
to which the subject referent is compared. The analysis, at present, is designed for 
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morphology-free comparatives like those in Mandarin Chinese or Udmurt. As 
such, it does not make any predictions for English or German landmark 
arguments, be it with NPIs or without. However, as I showed in Section 3, the 
landmark analysis does provide for the means to choose landmark sets according 
to various strategies, including a worst case strategy. This strategy will predict 
that the worst possible choice in a larger domain can be even worse than the worst 
possible choice in a smaller domain. (Vive versa, the context is predicted to be 
downward-entailing because a smaller domain N” can only lead to gentler worst 
case choices than a broader domain N.) Likewise, the available choices in 
CAND(Q) offer alternatives on which Mandarin Chinese dou can operate. 
Therefore, a landmark set analysis is suited to predict NPI licensing. 
 Finally, let me mention that sets-of-degree analyses can not easily be 
generalized to equatives. This is infelicitous because equatives give rise to BoNQ 
judgments as well. It would be desirable that ideas to explain BoNQ intuitions in 
comparatives can be reused for equatives. The following examples illustrate the 
effect; it is important to note that only ‘strictly’ equatives should be considered.  
 
(42) a. ?Sandy is exactly as smart as no other pupil. 
b. ?Sandy ist genauso schlau wie niemand sonst. 
 
The sentences in (42) cause the reader to stop and puzzle in exactly the same way 
as Gajewksi’s data in (40). To the extent that we find an explanation for (40) 
desirable, we’d also need one for (42). I won’t speculate which amendments could 
be made in an interval-based analysis to host the judgments in (42). 
 
 
6. English, German: Direct and Indirect BoNQ Effects 
 
In the last part of the paper, I will turn to the empirical reality of BoNQ judgments 
in English and German. Scholars and informants agree that negative quantifiers in 
comparative clauses are ill-formed. This holds for English and German. 
 
(43) a. *Sam is smarter than no other student is. 
b. *Sam ist klüger als kein anderer Student ist. 
 
Reactions change when speakers judge sentences with negative quantifiers in 
comparative phrases. Some of my first informants (mostly trained linguists) 
readily understood the QR inverse superlative reading for the examples in (44). 
These usually had been working on comparatives before. Some informants 
produced the inverse superlative paraphrase after some reflection. Some native 
speakers refuse (44.b) altogether (prominently Bierwisch 1987:107, ex. 121.b but 
also Gajewski 2009 and Hofstetter 2009).  
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(44) a.  Sam is smarter than no other student. 
b. Sam ist klüger als kein anderer Student. 
 
Most surprisingly, however, a number of native speakers spontaneously 
paraphrased (44.b) as “Sam is the smartest of all students”. In order to 
substantiate these anecdotal reactions, we devised an pilot study on German to 
test such sentences with a larger body of persons.6 Subjects were shown a picture 
like in Figure 1 and given a one-sentence description of ‘the suspect’. Based on 
this description, they had to decide who was the most likely ‘suspect’, multiple 
answers were allowed.  
 
 
 
fig. 1: ‘Who’s the suspect’ material with animals 
 
They were presented with comparative sentences with universal and negative 
quantifiers, in both the subject and comparative phrase. (I omitt glosses, given 
that the crucial properties of the English and German examples are identical.) 
 
(45) a. Der Täter ist dicker als alle anderen. 
    ‚the suspect is fatter than all others’ 
 
                                                
6I want to thank Heinke Knappe and Stefanie Rößler for their help and patience in devising the 
experiments, finding subjects and gathering the results. The full study is presently being written up 
as BA thesis.  
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b.  Alle  sind dicker als der Täter. 
    ‚everyone is fatter than the suspect’ 
c. Der Täter ist dicker als niemand (sonst). 
    ‚the suspect is fatter than nobody (else)’ 
d. Niemand ist dicker als der Täter. 
   ‚nobody is fatter than the suspect’ 
 
In addition, filler descriptions with and without comparatives where added. 
Subjects’ answers on who they considered ‘the suspect’ offers evidence how they 
interpret the comparative sentence. We conducted an offline questionaire study 
(45 subjects) and a study with EPrime which allowed to control for reading times 
(26 subjects). The material is still being evaluated, but the following trends are 
already clearly visible: Negative quantifiers in the comparative phrase were not 
classed as “incomprehensible”, subjects did compute a meaning for these stimuli. 
In the offline study, at least 50% of the answers to sentences of the crucial type in 
(45.c) showed that subjects computed the superlative reading, i.e. they interpreted 
(the German counterpart of) The suspect is fatter than nobody as ‘the suspect is 
fattest’. Error rates range as high as 80% for some stimuli. In the EPrime study, 
the error rates were likewise significantly higher for stimuli with negative 
quantifiers in the comparison phrase. All other stimuli were interpreted in line 
with a standard Heimian analysis of comparatives, occasional errors granted. The 
reading time study showed only a very slight delay effect for stimuli with 
negative quantifiers in the comparative phrase. The standard deviation for the 
crucial stimuli is significantly higher than that of other stimuli. This suggests that 
some subjects rated without hesitation and others started thinking about the 
sentences’ meaning. Surprisingly, niemand in subject position likewise caused a 
delay, such that the interacting causes of delay effects remain to be investigated.  
 The study has the character of a pilot study in that the material contained 
neither equatives nor other downward-entailing quantifiers. However, the results 
suggest that negative quantifiers in the comparative phrase are problematic for 
native speakers of German. Speakers systematically compute a meaning which is 
entirely unpredicted by any semantic theory of comparatives that I know of, no 
matter whether the theory predicts BoNQ effects or not. What they understand is a 
superlative reading which comes close to a superlative interpretation of equatives 
that has been observed elsewhere in the literature.  
 
(46) Sammy is as smart as no one else. 
Sammy ist so schlau wie niemand / keiner sonst. 
= ‚Sammy is the smartest of all’ 
 
Bierwisch (1987: 107) proposes to derive this reading as part of the standard 
semantics of equatives. However, other authors have classed it as an exceptional 
interpretation, and most recently Umbach (2009) argues in favor of an emphatic 
so construction. We can diagnose that apart from equatives, comparatives 
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likewise can be re-interpreted as ‘emphatic superlatives’. These readings do not 
follow by ordinary semantic composition of the (visible) parts of the sentence. 
 Our pilot study hence offers indirect evidence for BoNQ in German: Our 
informants were reluctant to interpret negative quantifiers in the comparative 
phrase as taking wide scope after quantifier raising. Frequently, informants failed 
to see the resulting inverse superlative (smarter than no one = ‘dumbest’). Instead, 
they produced an emphatic superlative reading which, to my knowledge, has 
never been acknowledged, neither in grammars of German nor in the linguistic 
literature. Computation also seems to have caused more delay for some speakers. 
These facts can be understood if we assume that the standard interpretation of 
quantifiers in the landmark argument of German comparatives is one where to 
BoNQ judgments: Negative quantifiers are not interpretable. As a reaction, 
speakers either see the second, QR reading or resort to exceptional rescue 
interpretations. It would not be consistent with the empirical findings to claim that 
QR in general causes problems, because universal quantifiers were interpreted 
unproblematicaly. Several follow-up questions need to be pursued. 
  
i. How do speakers react to downward-entailing quantifiers like nur wenige 
(‘few’) or selten (‘rarely’)? 
ii. How do speakers react to ‘exactly’ equatives and ‘so’ equatives with 
negative quantifiers? 
iii. Specifically, do speakers access the emphatic superlative reading faster in 
these cases (which would suggest that it is a standard way to interpret 
equatives, but an ad hoc interpretation for comparatives)? 
iv. Would they grade downward-entailing quantifiers in landmark arguments 
as ‘marked’ in a study which asks for grammaticality judgments? 
v. Can information structure render the QR reading more accessible? 
vi. What are the facts for English? 
 
At present, we can preliminarily conclude that German shows (weak) BoNQ in 
the landmark argument. In addition, German is one of the languages that clearly 
allows for existential NPIs in the landmark. Taking these two observations 
together, it looks like a rewarding project to adapt the landmark set analysis of 
comparatives to German. A preliminary exploration suggests that this project 
seems feasible. For space limits, however, I will leave it for another occasion.  
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